 Bridge burning and escape routesPublic Choice, 2020, vol. 184, issue 3, No 9, 399-414 Abstract: Abstract Thomas Schelling (Arms and influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966) cites bridge burning as a method of commitment. While such a commitment can increase the chances of success in a conflict, it generally will lower one’s payoff if the conflict is lost. I use a contest framework and establish conditions under which such commitment can raise a player’s expected payoff. The comparative static effects of bridge burning never are favorable at an interior equilibrium, but the strategy may induce the opponent to concede the contest’s outcome. I also analyze the strategy, associated with Sun Tzu, of leaving an escape path open for one’s enemy. This strategy always succeeds at an interior equilibrium and raises the expected payoffs of both players. Under certain parameter restrictions, leaving an open escape path also has the potential of inducing the opponent to concede the contest. A special case of the model is offered to explain why a group vulnerable to a wealth transfer might prefer a less efficient tax system to a more efficient system. Keywords: Bridge burning; Thomas Schelling; Tullock contest; Military strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00726-z Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00726-z Access Statistics for this article Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II More articles in Public Choice from Springer |
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