Corruption predictability and corruption voting in Asian democracies

Eric C. C. Chang ()
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Eric C. C. Chang: Michigan State University

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 184, issue 3, No 5, 307-326

Abstract: Abstract I examine how the structure of corrupt exchanges between voters and politicians—an important-yet-underexplored form of informal institutions—shapes voters’ electoral behavior toward corruption. I argue that when voters have a clear idea of whom to bribe to secure desired services and how much they need to offer, they are less likely to engage in corruption voting and hold corrupt incumbents electorally accountable for their malfeasance. Utilizing the World Business Environment Survey on corruption predictability and the Asian Barometer survey on voters’ electoral behaviors, I report empirical evidence that institutionalized corruption promotes greater electoral tolerance of corrupt politicians in Asian democracies. The results hold against a number of robustness checks. The paper thus furthers our understanding of the effect of informal political institutions on corruption voting as well as Asia’s corruption exceptionalism.

Keywords: Corruption voting; Corruption predictability; Electoral accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D49 D72 D73 D83 D84 H42 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00760-x

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