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Game theory and the study of American political development

Sean Gailmard ()
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Sean Gailmard: University of California

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 185, issue 3, No 6, 335-357

Abstract: Abstract Game theoretic analyses of American institutions and American political development largely are disconnected enterprises, yet they share many points of contact and thus opportunities for fruitful exchange. In this essay I discuss the value and limits of formalization for the enterprise of institutional analysis that those fields have in common. I conceptualize two broad approaches that formal modelers have taken to study institutions—institutions as game forms, and institutions as equilibria—that have been relatively successful for understanding institutional choice and stability. At the same time, formal modelers have been less successful in addressing institutional change and development, topics about which APD has much to offer. Overall, I contend that crosstalk between the two fields can benefit them both.

Keywords: Game theory; American political development; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00705-4

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