The political economy of voluntary public service

Arup Bose, Debashis Pal () and David Sappington
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Debashis Pal: University of Cincinnati

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 186, issue 1, No 4, 29-61

Abstract: Abstract We characterize the voluntary public service policy that minimizes the expected cost of delivering a public service (e.g., jury or military service). We then examine whether a majority rule voting procedure will implement the voluntary public service policy (VPS) whenever it entails lower expected cost than mandatory public service (MPS). We find that majority rule often favors MPS in the sense that majority rule implements MPS when VPS would secure the requisite public service at lower expected cost.

Keywords: Voluntary public service; Favoritism under majority rule; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00752-x

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