Third-party intervention in the presence of supreme values

Artyom Jelnov

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 186, issue 3, No 5, 267-274

Abstract: Abstract I set out a model of third-party intervention in which parties to a conflict can have supreme values. An attacker can decide to use own-population civilians as human shields against a defender. A third-party adjudicator can find fault with the defender for measures that harm the human shields. The criticism is an incentive for the attacker to use the own-population human shields. The supreme values relate to the value placed on the lives of the human shields. I describe the possible equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: Terrorism; Human shield; Prejudice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00717-0

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