Salem with and without witches, and also Geneva and Berlin

Peter Nannestad ()
Additional contact information
Peter Nannestad: Aarhus University

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 186, issue 3, No 2, 229-239

Abstract: Abstract Peter Bernholz’s cases of supreme values exhibit authoritarianism, totalitarianism and terror. Supreme values are, however, a necessary, but not sufficient condition for authoritarian or totalitarian rule. That observation raises the question of the conditions under which supreme value systems result or do not result in authoritarianism and totalitarianism (or terrorism). I address the question using a case study based on Article 1.1 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz; GG), which fulfils the twin criteria for being a supreme value (being at the top of a lexicographical ordering of values and not being substitutable with others), but is not associated with authoritarianism, totalitarianism and terror. The contrary is the case. I compare the supreme value institutionalized in Article 1.1 GG to two supreme value systems that historically have been associated with Bernholz’s cases, namely Calvinism in 16th century Geneva and German Nazism (1933–1945). I consider three explanations for the association of supreme values with authoritarianism, totalitarianism and terror: when the content of the supreme value is malevolent to some groups; when the supreme value has been imposed on a society; and when supreme values facilitate rent extraction. In the cases that I consider, rent extraction seems to be a compelling explanation.

Keywords: Supreme values; Authoritarianism; Totalitarianism; Terror; Rent extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-019-00725-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00725-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00725-0

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().