Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany

Carsten Hefeker

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 186, issue 3, No 7, 287-308

Abstract: Abstract Germany prides itself in having one of the most successful central banks and national currencies with respect to independence and stability. I show that not only were both imposed on the country after 1945, but that German experts and officials resisted both initially. It thus represents a rare case of the successful imposition of institutions from abroad. Events are discussed in light of Peter Bernholz’s requirements of stable money and an independent central bank.

Keywords: Currency reform; Bundesbank; Central bank independence; Institutional reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 N14 N24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany (2019)
Working Paper: Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00734-z

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