EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Egalitarianism and the democratic deconsolidation: Is democracy compatible with socialism?

François Facchini and Mickael Melki ()
Additional contact information
Mickael Melki: Paris School of Business

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 186, issue 3, No 14, 447-465

Abstract: Abstract The unprecedented reduction in popular support for democracy represents a risk of democratic deconsolidation. The new situation echoes old debates on the compatibility of democracy with capitalism and socialism. This article provides empirical support for the incompatibility of socialism with democracy by providing evidence suggesting that when citizens adopt egalitarianism as a supreme value, they are ready to sacrifice democracy for the sake of equality. Using individual data, we observe that the decline in support for democracy over generations and over time is accompanied by rising support for egalitarian values in US and European democracies. Moreover, democracies with stronger preferences for egalitarianism also have less public support for democracy, suggesting a tradeoff between both values.

Keywords: Democracy; Deconsolidation; Egalitarianism; Millennials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-019-00744-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Egalitarianism and the democratic deconsolidation: Is democracy compatible with socialism? (2019)
Working Paper: Egalitarianism and the democratic deconsolidation: Is democracy compatible with socialism? (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00744-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00744-x

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00744-x