Harming a favored side: an anomaly with supreme values and good intentions

Arye Hillman ()

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 186, issue 3, No 6, 275-285

Abstract: Abstract Third-party adjudicators, be they governments, or politicians or academics, can take positions regarding who initiated a conflict, who is to blame for harm or damage, and who has violated international law. Decisions need not always be objective. There can be bias. I consider the anomaly of biased adjudicators providing incentives for harm to their favored side. The anomaly arises in real-life circumstances. The puzzle is why adjudicators with good intentions cooperate in bringing harm to the civilian population of the side with which they sympathize. Anomalies are usually addressed in a context of behavioral economics. I consider both behavioral and rational explanations.

Keywords: Supreme values; Third-party intervention; Politics of identity; Cognitive dissonance; Post-modernism; Selective-perception bias; Prejudice; Israel; Hamas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00750-z

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