Kornai goes to Kenya

Peter Leeson, Colin Harris and Andrew Myers ()
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Andrew Myers: St. Olaf College

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 187, issue 1, No 9, 99-110

Abstract: Abstract János Kornai developed soft budget constraint logic to explain the socialist world’s dysfunctional economies. We extend his logic to explain dysfunctional land reform in the developing world. International development organizations such as the World Bank provide support for land privatization to developing-country governments, softening their budget constraints. Softer budget constraints encourage developing-country governments to pursue land privatization even when its social value is negative. Kenya’s land reform program illustrates the soft budget constraint syndrome.

Keywords: Janos Kornai; Soft budget constraint; Land reform; Privatization; Kenya (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D73 F53 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00782-w

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