Favoring co-partisan controlled areas in central government distributive programs: the role of local party organizations

Özge Kemahlıoğlu () and Reşat Bayer ()
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Özge Kemahlıoğlu: Sabancı University
Reşat Bayer: Koç University

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 187, issue 3, No 3, 319 pages

Abstract: Abstract We analyze the non-contributory health insurance program (“green cards”) in Turkey with RDD (Regression Discontinuity Design) and show that more citizens receive green cards in municipalities controlled by the national incumbent party, AKP (Adalalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Our explanation for the finding emphasizes the role of local party organizations and sub-national incumbency. Local government control provides additional resources to the party to strengthen its organization, which then helps the party to target the beneficiaries of central government programs like green cards more effectively. Theoretically, we join the literature that uncovers the significance of incorporating local actors into the analysis of central government programs. Our contribution lies in depicting the mediating role of political parties and their local organizations. Even in a highly centralized context like Turkey, parties’ informal role affects program implementation. Unequal access to free healthcare results from the asymmetry between national and opposition parties in how their local organizations interact with the central government.

Keywords: Distributive politics; Local party organization; Decentralization; Non-contributory health insurance; Turkey (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 H51 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00774-5

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