Ignoring the Electoral College: why public choice economists understate the probability of decisive voters

Dwight R. Lee ()
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Dwight R. Lee: Ball State University

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 187, issue 3, No 8, 439-454

Abstract: Abstract When considering the probability of voters being decisive in presidential elections, public choice economists typically proceed as if the probability can reasonably be approximated by assuming that the winner is determined by simple majority vote. It is well known the Electoral College can cause presidential candidates to lose elections despite winning the popular vote (an election inversion). But the Electoral College’s ability to increase the probability of some voters being decisive effectively has been ignored, despite such increases having occurred in 10 of the last 49 presidential elections. By examining the influence of the Electoral College in most of the presidential elections from 1824 to 2016, I explain and give examples of how the probabilities of some voters being decisive were elevated above what they would have been under majority rule, with the increase being truly astounding in several cases. The examples do not weaken the importance of expressive voting, but our understanding of such voting is improved by considering the probability effects of the Electoral College on voter decisiveness.

Keywords: Electoral College; Decisive voters; Decisive states; Expressive voting; Binomial distributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00787-5

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