Cyclical accountability

Dieter Stiers () and Anna Kern
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Dieter Stiers: KU Leuven
Anna Kern: Ghent University

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 189, issue 1, No 3, 49 pages

Abstract: Abstract A large body of literature has investigated vote and popularity functions, identifying the factors influencing presidential approval ratings or presidential votes. The studies have revealed a strong correlation between the state of the economy and incumbent support. However, so far, less attention has been paid to when voters relate their perceptions of the president’s performance to the real-world economy in a systematic way. While some research focuses on voters’ behavior on Election Day, other studies do not take electoral cycles into account. Hence, while politics often is assumed to follow a “political business cycle”, it is less clear whether voters follow the same logic in holding incumbents accountable for economic conditions. In this article, we offer a systematic study of the timing of accountability mechanisms in the domain of the economy. The analyses show strong patterns of accountability throughout the electoral cycle.

Keywords: Retrospective voting; Voter myopia; Presidential approval; Economic voting; Electoral accountability; Presidential elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00856-9

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