A Talmudic constrained voting majority rule

Ronen Bar-El () and Mordechai E. Schwarz ()
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Ronen Bar-El: The Open University of Israel
Mordechai E. Schwarz: The Open University of Israel

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 189, issue 3, No 8, 465-491

Abstract: Abstract Talmudic Law requires a minimal supermajority (13 out of 23) for conviction, but at the same time, provides that a unanimous conviction leads to a mistrial. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for sincere and strategic voting and show that under the Talmudic rule, the probability of the first type judicial error is lower than that computed by Feddersen and Pessendorfer (Am Polit Sci Rev 92(1):23–35, 1998) and Coughlan (Am Polit Sci Rev 94(2):375–393, 2000). However, the probability of a second type error marginally is higher.

Keywords: Jury; Voting; Mistrial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D71 D72 K00 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00895-w

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