Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors

Jianan Wang ()
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Jianan Wang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Public Choice, 2021, vol. 189, issue 3, No 10, 515-531

Abstract: Abstract We analyze a model of binary choice by a committee, when information is hard and pre-voting deliberation is allowed. Each member has, independently of the others, a positive probability of getting a private signal about the true state; with the remaining probability the member is uninformed. Hard information means that lying is disallowed during deliberation—informed members can reveal publicly or hide their signals, while uninformed voters have to disclose their ignorance. We allow non-consequentialist members whose thresholds for switching to the non-status-quo action vary with the number of informative signals. We show that in general, committee members will never reveal information fully during deliberation, even when we rule out partisan types who want the same action in all states. In particular, unanimity rule performs no worse than other rules.

Keywords: Deliberation; Information revelation; Strategic voting; Collective choice; Non-consequentialist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00904-y

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