Dynamic anarchy: the evolution and economics of the beguny sect in eighteenth-twentieth century Russia

Vladimir Vladimirovich Maltsev ()
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Vladimir Vladimirovich Maltsev: Financial University Under the Government of the Russian Federation

Public Choice, 2022, vol. 190, issue 1, No 6, 126 pages

Abstract: Abstract The paper investigates the possibility of evolution in superstitions that support self-governance arrangements. To show that superstitions may adapt to changes in economic constraints, I study a Russian religious sect called the beguny. The sect originated in the eighteenth century and operated in continual opposition to the Russian state. The beguny relied on a system of self-governance, centered around the notion of religious purity. As economic conditions shifted, the beguny rationally amended the concept of religious purity to adapt to change. As a result of its malleability, the sect first evolved from nomadic wandering to a system of refuge providers. Afterwards, the beguny endured an evolutionary split, after which one-half of the sect became a complex hierarchical organization living in a network of hidden monastic cells, whilst the other established monasteries deep in the Siberian taiga. That division allowed the beguny to survive until the twenty-first century. The simple, yet important conclusion of my analysis is that superstitions do not need to be discarded when they cease being socially productive. Instead, they can evolve to continue an efficient supply of governance.

Keywords: Old believers; Beguny sect; Anarchy; Evolution; Superstitions; Rationality; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N33 N43 P48 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00920-y

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