Philadelphia reconsidered: participant curation, the Gerry Committee, and US constitutional design

Stephen C. Phillips (), Alex P. Smith and Peter R. Licari
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Stephen C. Phillips: University of Florida
Alex P. Smith: Oklahoma State University
Peter R. Licari: University of Florida

Public Choice, 2022, vol. 190, issue 3, No 10, 407-426

Abstract: Abstract Legislative design was a critical question at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. The peculiar compromise that was struck—featuring proportional and republican elements—defies the logic of the Convention’s majority rule. We investigate how in establishing the new national legislature, small state delegates were able to prevail over the large state majority and secure the Connecticut Compromise. We argue that the small state coalition’s victory owes to their strategy at a critical juncture: the Gerry Committee. The Gerry Committee amplified the contours of the debate over legislative design and the careful curation of its participants precipitated a shift of structural and creative freedom allowing for the consideration of alternative solutions. The Committee produced an environment favorable to a compromise on legislative structure and power by manipulating the policy dimensions connecting representation, taxation, and slavery. Participant curation was essential in allowing political opponents—the small states—to overcome unfavorable conditions, maximize utility, and craft a proposal capable of approval by delegates and eventual constitutional ratification.

Keywords: US Constitutional Convention; Committees; Legislative rules; American founding; Political institutions; Political strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00943-5

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