The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars

Soeren Schwuchow and George Tridimas ()
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George Tridimas: Ulster University Business School

Public Choice, 2022, vol. 192, issue 3, No 3, 249-272

Abstract: Abstract In 594 BCE, the Athenian lawgiver Solon, called upon to resolve a deepening social crisis, introduced a new constitution and mandated that in civil conflicts, no citizen is to remain apathetic and must take sides. Because the law seemed to support strife, it presents a puzzle. The paper offers a political economy rationale for Solon’s law against neutrality, modeling social conflict as a rent-seeking competition. We divide society into three groups, a hereditary aristocracy, which monopolized power before the Solonian constitution, a rival wealth-based commercial elite, called the new Solonian elite, and the poor, who are enfranchised only partly. We then identify the conditions under which the third group is better off by allying with one of the other groups, protecting the Solonian constitution. In our framework, Solon’s ban on neutrality is an attempt to change the payoffs from violent redistributions of rents, so that conflict is avoided. Accordingly, the ban should not only impede excessive rent seeking, but also prevent the exclusion of any social group.

Keywords: Ancient Athens; Solon; Political non-neutrality; Rent seeking; Intra-elite competition; Political apathy; Civil war; Inclusive institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-00980-8

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