Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods

Ryan J. Vander Wielen ()
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Ryan J. Vander Wielen: Stony Brook University

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 194, issue 1, No 4, 75-99

Abstract: Abstract Several prominent theories of legislative organization contend that members coalesce into parties to minimize the collective action problems inherent in pursuing goals that have the character of public goods. Models in that vein ascribe a constrained and primarily reactive role to party leaders, affording them little independent discretion. Such an approach is particularly problematic when considering the nature of public goods pursuits in conjunction with electoral demands for party cohesion and legislative output. Furthermore, the standard treatment of party leadership is inconsistent with empirical findings that party leaders systematically punish disloyalty. The model forwarded herein assumes that party leaders are proactive in shaping members’ contribution decisions by setting punishment levels to produce coalitions of a certain size, but they are always mindful of the overall welfare of the party. I find support for the theoretical propositions derived from my model when examining US House roll-call data over the period of 2001 to 2018.

Keywords: Party leadership; Public goods; Party discipline; Party punishment; Party cohesion; Party reputations; Collective benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01017-w

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