From defunding to refunding police: institutions and the persistence of policing budgets

Tate Fegley () and Ilia Murtazashvili ()
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Tate Fegley: Montreat College
Ilia Murtazashvili: University of Pittsburgh

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 196, issue 1, No 5, 123-140

Abstract: Abstract Dozens of municipalities in the United States pledged to defund the police after Minneapolis police officers murdered George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, while he was in their custody. We first consider whether the municipalities that promised to defund the police actually did so. We find that they did not: municipalities that promised to defund the police temporarily reduced police budgets, only to later increase them beyond what they were previously. We then argue that two mechanisms—the electoral incentives of city politicians to provide jobs and services (what we call allocational politics) and the strength of police unions—explain why the predominant political equilibrium is one with protected police officers as a barrier to reform. We discuss several additional reforms suggested by public choice scholars interested in the problem of predatory policing.

Keywords: Policing; Defunding police; Neighborhood policing; Quasi-markets; Allocational politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 H11 H76 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01063-y

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