 The political economy of rightsPublic Choice, 2024, vol. 198, issue 3, No 3, 297-316 Abstract: Abstract After World War II, the quest for rights began to address the interests of particular groups, including minorities, children, women, animals, the environment, and workers. Many groups, however, continued or started to rely on the market, or private collective action, to further their interests. This paper offers a model to explain the choice between market and political action. Benefits achieved through collective action are a club good whose benefits are enjoyed and costs are borne by the group. Rights are a public good which benefits the whole class of people who qualify while its costs are borne only by the fighters, which invites free riding. Therefore, rights are more costly to achieve, but their benefits are higher because they are harder to undo and may facilitate further action; so they are chosen if their benefit/cost ratio is higher than that of collective action. The history of the American labor, black freedom, and women’s movements, and their intersections, provides a good fit for the model’s predictions. Keywords: Rights; Collective action; Club goods; Public goods; Labor movement; Women’s movement; Civil rights movement (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:198:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01124-2 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01124-2 Access Statistics for this article Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II More articles in Public Choice from Springer |
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