Promotion prospects and policy choice: evidence from the land market in China
Chang Xue and
Xiaoyu Zhang
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Chang Xue: Sun Yat-Sen University
Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 1, No 6, 119-147
Abstract:
Abstract The career prospects of politicians are crucial determinants of their policy choices. This paper studies the impact of promotion incentives on policy choices by analyzing data on prefecture officials and local land market dynamics in China from 2007 to 2017. Our findings indicate that a decrease in promotion prospects for prefecture party secretaries hampers their motivation to promote economic growth. This results in a decline in industrial land transactions. However, similar patterns are not observed among mayors. Further exploration reveals that officials experiencing a decline in prospects exhibit a negative stance toward economic growth, as evidenced by their annual working reports. This research sheds light on the nuanced relationship between political career incentives and policy outcomes in the context of local land markets.
Keywords: Political connection; Promotion incentive; Local government policy; Land market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 O43 P25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01145-5
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01145-5
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