Revolutionary leaders and the punishment of critics

Christian J. Sander ()
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Christian J. Sander: Kiel University

Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 1, No 10, 237-256

Abstract: Abstract I explore a previously neglected mechanism of mass mobilization in autocracies. Revolutionary leaders may deliberately provoke punishment from the incumbent regime to signal their political conviction and thus encourage citizens to identify with and support the revolutionary movement. I model the interplay of repression, criticism, and revolutionary actions as a dynamic game with incomplete information about the leader’s type. The role of the revolutionary leader is to enable people to identify with the movement by credibly embodying political change. From the incumbent’s perspective, repression turns out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a severe punishment of critics increases citizens’ cost of participating in revolutionary actions. On the other hand, harsh repressions may simultaneously establish a trustworthy leader whom people want to follow in order to replace the current political regime. My results thus help explain a stylized fact, namely that revolutionary leaders sometimes need to fail before they can succeed.

Keywords: Revolutions; Protests; Revolutionary leader; Repression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01150-8

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