Quiet revolutions in early-modern England
Peter Grajzl and
Peter Murrell
Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 3, No 2, 357-381
Abstract:
Abstract Revolutions are invariably viewed as the violent replacement of an existing political order. However, many social innovations that result in fundamental institutional and cultural shifts do not occur via force nor have clear beginning and ending dates. Focusing on early-modern England, we provide the first-ever quantitative inquiry into such quiet revolutions. Using existing topic model estimates that leverage caselaw and print-culture corpora, we construct annual time series of attention to 100 legal and 110 cultural ideas between the mid-sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries. We estimate the timing of structural breaks in these series. Quiet revolutions begin when there are concurrent upturns in attention to several related topics. Early-modern England featured several quiet, but profound, revolutionary episodes. The financial revolution began by 1660. The Protectorate saw a revolution in land law. A revolution in caselaw relating to families was underway by the early eighteenth century. Elizabethan times saw an increased emphasis on basic skills and showed signs of a Puritan revolution affecting both theology and ideas on institutions. In the decade before the Civil War, a quiet revolution of dissent preceded the turmoil that led to a king’s beheading.
Keywords: Quiet revolutions; Text-as-data; Machine-learning; Time series; Caselaw; Culture; Early-modern England; C80; C22; K00; Z10; N43; P10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01093-6
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01093-6
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