Revolutionary Constitutions: are they revolutionary in terms of constitutional design?

Justin T. Callais () and Andrew T. Young ()
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Justin T. Callais: University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Andrew T. Young: Texas Tech University

Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 3, No 5, 423-455

Abstract: Abstract We use comparative constitutions project (CCP) data to explore whether Constitutions that follow revolutions are designed differently. We employ matching methods using 36 treatments (revolutionary Constitutions) and 162 control units (new Constitutional adoptions without a revolution). We find some evidence that revolutionary Constitutions are less rigid (i.e., their procedural barriers to amendment are weaker). Otherwise, revolutionary Constitutions seem similar to non-revolutionary ones. However, we do find strong evidence that revolutionary Constitutions are associated with a greater likelihood of ex post democracy. The results (less rigid, higher likelihood of democracy) hold for those not associated with ending colonial rule or the fall of the USSR. The greater ex post democracy result is reported for various democracy measures.

Keywords: Revolutions; Constitutions; Political economy; Matching methods; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 K40 P00 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01094-5

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