Religious reforms and large-scale rebellions (via the case of the Honganji sect of the True Pure Land Buddhism)

Vladimir Maltsev ()
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Vladimir Maltsev: University of Glasgow

Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 3, No 12, 589-601

Abstract: Abstract The paper explores the economics behind two large-scale rebellions in Japan throughout 1532–1536 and 1570–1580, launched by a religious organization called Honganji. The paper argues that Honganji’s large-scale rebellions took off primarily due to religious reforms, particularly, the creation of an after-life pardon doctrine, which enabled the functioning of more potent incentives that fostered participation. First, the doctrine raised the costs of not joining a rebellion by excluding the non-participants and consigning them to hell. This resulted in immediate spiritual, social and economic penalties, as condemned individuals were considered religiously corrupt and were expelled from the sect’s temple towns and sect-dominated village communities. Second, the after-life pardon doctrine reduced the costs of rebellious participation by guaranteeing an instant rebirth in paradise after dying for the sect’s cause. As many individuals at the time saw the world through the lens of religion and spirituality, the guarantee of paradise was an especially potent incentive to join a rebellion.

Keywords: Honganji; Religious reforms; Paradise; Hell; Large-scale rebellions; Japan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N45 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01096-3

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