Institutional stickiness and Afghanistan’s unending revolution

Tariq Basir, Ilia Murtazashvili () and Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
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Tariq Basir: University of Pittsburgh
Ilia Murtazashvili: University of Pittsburgh
Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili: University of Pittsburgh

Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 3, No 4, 403-422

Abstract: Abstract Analysis of revolutions typically focuses on de jure constitutions and how their elite- or mass-led character influences their consequences. De facto constitutions are political and economic rules that people use to govern themselves which may or may not be recognized in the evolving de jure constitution. We argue that the nature of change resulting from revolutions depends on whether the emergent constitutional order recognizes the autonomy of de facto constitutions. We theorize neglect, disregard, and hostility toward de facto constitutions contributes to cycles of constitutional instability. We use this theory to explain Afghanistan’s unending revolution. Neither elite-led nor mass-led revolutions in Afghanistan produced a lasting constitutional order because they share a disregard for the de facto constitution.

Keywords: Revolutions; De jure institutions; De facto institutions; Predation; Foreign aid; Afghanistan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 D74 O19 P30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01119-z

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