On the tendency of revolutions to devour their own children

Louis Rouanet ()
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Louis Rouanet: University of Texas at El Paso

Public Choice, 2024, vol. 200, issue 3, No 13, 603-626

Abstract: Abstract Genuine revolutions often use violence not only against their enemies but also against their friends. This paper argues that using violence against the proponents of a revolution functions as a way to boost collective action. A weakest-link punishment against the revolutionaries contributing the least to the revolutionary cause can be a way to solve Tullock’s paradox of revolutions. Further implications are developed. First, we show that those benefiting the most from the revolution and facing the lowest cost of punishing will self-select into the group using punishment to boost contributions to the revolutionary cause. Second, we explain that weakest-link punishment can be over-provided when its provision is decentralized, in which case centralizing punishment may be an efficient response. We use the French Revolution as a case study to illustrate our theory. While the proximate cause of the Terror during the French Revolution was to avoid free-riding, its underlying cause may not have been the “blank-slate” mindset of the revolutionaries but the reactionary and inflexible nature of the Ancien Régime’s institutions.

Keywords: Public Choice; Revolutions; Collective action; French Revolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B53 D72 N43 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01130-4

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