The political economy of paternalism

Kai A. Konrad ()
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Kai A. Konrad: Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Public Choice, 2024, vol. 201, issue 1, No 6, 81 pages

Abstract: Abstract Some citizens place a high value on making decisions for themselves. Other citizens are happy to delegate decisions to a government agency. Such differences in political attitudes to paternalism can be explained in a strict rational-choice model with citizens’ heterogeneous tastes in the economic sphere. Citizens with more eccentric tastes and with high decision-making abilities tend to favor a libertarian regime. If majority preferences matter, heterogeneity in economic preferences and analytical abilities can also explain whether the political regime is more paternalist or more libertarian. As decision-making skills are a learnable capability, the strategic complementarity of individuals’ investments in analytical skills in the context of political regime outcomes suggests a feedback mechanism that can cause multiple expectations equilibria. Both a libertarian regime or a paternalist regime can emerge.

Keywords: Paternalism; Libertarianism; Autonomous decision-making; Majoritarian decisions; Decision skills; Formation of decision capabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D78 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01168-y

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