Ruled by robots: preference for algorithmic decision makers and perceptions of their choices

Marina Chugunova and Wolfgang J. Luhan ()
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Marina Chugunova: Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Wolfgang J. Luhan: University of Portsmouth, Richmond Building

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 202, issue 1, No 1, 24 pages

Abstract: Abstract As technology-assisted decision-making is becoming more widespread, it is important to understand how the algorithmic nature of the decision maker affects how decisions are perceived by those affected. We use an online experiment to study the preference for human or algorithmic decision makers in redistributive decisions. In particular, we consider whether an algorithmic decision maker will be preferred because of its impartiality. Contrary to previous findings, the majority of participants (over 60%) prefer the algorithm as a decision maker over a human—but this is not driven by concerns over biased decisions. However, despite this preference, the decisions made by humans are regarded more favorably. Subjective ratings of the decisions are mainly driven by participants’ own material interests and fairness ideals. Participants tolerate any explainable deviation between the actual decision and their ideals but react very strongly and negatively to redistribution decisions that are not consistent with any fairness principles.

Keywords: Delegation; Decision-making for others; Algorithm aversion; Redistribution; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D31 D81 D9 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01178-w

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