Environmental regulation, regulatory spillovers and rent-seeking

Juan Pablo González ()
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Juan Pablo González: Universidad de Buenos Aires

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 202, issue 1, No 10, 217-250

Abstract: Abstract How do special interests react to an increase in their regulatory burden? In this paper, I use a shock to the regulatory environment by analyzing state-level enforcement of the Clean Air Act during the fracking boom. First, I show that fracking is associated with an increase in state regulatory activities for non-energy-related industries, generating regulatory spillovers to firms unrelated to fracking. Using the fact that fracking had regulatory spillovers to other industries, I use the presence of fracking as an instrument for environmental regulation for non-energy-related firms. I find that increased environmental enforcement is associated with an increase in state campaign contributions going to Republicans, and particularly to legislative races in competitive districts. These results provide some of the first evidence that changes in the regulatory environment can spur private sector mobilization with the potential to affect broader areas of policy through its electoral consequences.

Keywords: Environmental regulation; Campaign contributions; Fracking; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 G38 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01189-7

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