Sympathy with resentment: Willingness to report criminal behavior depends on the punishment

Jason Aimone (), Lucas Rentschler (), Vernon Smith () and Bart J. Wilson ()
Additional contact information
Jason Aimone: Baylor University
Lucas Rentschler: Utah State University and the Center for Growth and Opportunity
Vernon Smith: Chapman University
Bart J. Wilson: Chapman University

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 202, issue 3, No 3, 343-365

Abstract: Abstract Adam Smith’s theory of justice holds that the appropriate punishment for a misdeed is determined, in part, by the sympathy elicited on behalf of the victim. Specifically, Smith states that: “…our first approbation of punishment is not founded upon the regard to public utility…it is our sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer…” (Smith, 1978: 475). To demonstrate his point, Smith relates an anecdote in which civilians were unwilling to report wrongdoing because the offender’s punishment was far too extreme. In this paper, we employ a laboratory experiment to investigate whether the willingness to report a crime diminishes when the severity of the punishment is dramatically elevated. Our findings reveal, as predicted by Smith, that a steep increase in the severity of the punishment indeed reduces the likelihood of individuals reporting offenders. Interestingly, that effect is not foreseen by potential offenders, who, in response to the more severe expected punishment, reduce their propensities to commit offenses.

Keywords: Punishment; Criminal justice; Adam Smith; Experiments; B12; C90; K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-024-01233-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:202:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01233-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01233-6

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().