Pious people, patronage jobs, and the labor market: Turkey under Erdoğan’s AKP

Cem Oyvat (), Hasan Tekgüç () and Alper H. Yagci ()
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Cem Oyvat: University of Greenwich
Hasan Tekgüç: Kadir Has University
Alper H. Yagci: Boğaziçi University

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 203, issue 3, No 6, 465-491

Abstract: Abstract In fragmented societies, electoral competition often entails using public office to advance group interests. Using individual-level polling data from 2012 to 2018, we analyze whether age cohorts entering the labor market before and after the religiously conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in Turkey experienced different public employment outcomes based on their religion and religiosity. Our analysis reveals that under the AKP rule, pious Sunnis (who constitute a large part of the society) significantly increased their presence in public sector employment (notably among women) and in high-status private jobs (notably among men). Furthermore, the subset of highly religious Sunnis (only 9.3% of the population) improved their likelihood of being employed in the public sector compared to other pious Sunnis and everyone else. Our findings are likely to be driven by the lifting of the headscarf ban in public employment and AKP’s strategic use of public employment and resources to reward like-minded groups in both the public and private spheres.

Keywords: Turkey; Public sector employment; Patronage; Political Islam; Event-study design; Clientelism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 J45 J71 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01211-y

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