Constituency size and turnout in mixed electoral systems

Alex Keena ()
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Alex Keena: Virginia Commonwealth University

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 204, issue 1, No 9, 169-180

Abstract: Abstract Scholars of democratic representation argue that polity size affects political representation in a multitude of ways. Studies of elections consistently show a negative correlation between population size and political participation, particularly in first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections. Less research has investigated the effects of size scaling in mixed electoral systems. I posit that tier linkage is critical in determining whether or not mixed systems using FPTP are subject to the “size effect”. To test this hypothesis, I study recent legislative election returns from 10 national assemblies. I find that unlinked systems using “parallel voting” tiers are vulnerable to the size effect on turnout. In five out of the six assemblies that use parallel voting, there is a negative association between turnout and constituency population size. By contrast, in the remaining four assemblies that use tier linkage, there is not a negative correlation between turnout and size with the exception of South Korea, which recently adopted reforms. The results underscore the potential of seat and/or vote linkage to improve representational outcomes in mixed systems.

Keywords: Mixed electoral systems; Representation; Constituency size scaling; Population; Turnout; Political participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01274-5

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