The mixed local-proportional electoral system: balancing political interests and common good

Jarosław Flis (), Marek M. Kaminski () and Jeremiasz Salamon ()
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Jarosław Flis: Jagiellonian University
Marek M. Kaminski: University of California
Jeremiasz Salamon: Kraków University of Economics

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 204, issue 1, No 12, 236 pages

Abstract: Abstract We propose a new electoral system, Mixed Local-Proportional (MLP), that reconciles reforms beneficial for the polity with existing political interests. The MLP system maintains the current distribution of seats among parties while addressing problematic issues with the existing Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) system by engineering OLPR’s intra-party properties. Key features include dividing districts into subdistricts with plurality voting, allocating proportional seats using a restricted Jefferson-D’Hondt method, and reducing the number of candidates per party. We explain the MLP system’s mechanics, simulate election results based on recent election data, and discuss variants. Expected political consequences include improved territorial representation, reduced intra-party competition, reduced voter cognitive overload, and stronger ties between voters and MPs. The Polish Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform accepted the proposal for further processing.

Keywords: Electoral reform; Mixed local-proportional (MLP) electoral system; Poland; Territorial representation; Open-list proportional representation (OLPR); Jefferson-D'Hondt method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01286-1

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