Voter disengagement and dissatisfaction under Japan’s mixed electoral system

Ko Maeda ()
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Ko Maeda: University of North Texas

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 204, issue 1, No 3, 50 pages

Abstract: Abstract Although Japan’s mixed electoral system, introduced in 1994, was intended to foster robust competition between two major parties, small parties have survived by allying with larger parties and coordinating candidate nominations in electoral districts. As a result, districts across the country feature varying lineups of parties, forcing many voters whose preferred parties do not run candidates in their districts to make unpleasant choices in elections. My empirical analysis of aggregate and survey data strongly suggests that these voters are more likely than others to fully or partially abstain from voting and to feel dissatisfied with politics.

Keywords: Japan; Mixed electoral system; Abstention; Voter disengagement; Voter satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01293-2

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