The spectacular enlargement of the Bundestag and the long road to the 2023 German electoral law reform

Joachim Behnke ()
Additional contact information
Joachim Behnke: Zeppelin University

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 204, issue 1, No 6, 123 pages

Abstract: Abstract Since 2002, the regular size of the German Bundestag has been 598 seats. However, due to overhang and compensatory mandates, the Bundestag was enlarged to 709 seats after the 2017 election and to 736 seats after the 2021 election. This made the Bundestag the largest parliament of any democratically governed nation state in the world. To address this issue, the Bundestag passed a reform of the electoral law on March 17, 2023. This article explains the mechanics behind the significant increase in seats in 2021. Furthermore, it analyzes the conditions that must be met for a significant increase to occur. Specifically, it examines the relationship between the increase in surplus seats that triggered the expansion and the change in the party system’s structure. This relationship is demonstrated by developing a simple formal model. The German electoral system is a system of personalized proportional representation. However, as shown, some essential and desirable normative requirements that such a system should fulfill are mutually incompatible. Against this background and considering the history of the reform, it is demonstrated how the chosen reform option developed.

Keywords: Mixed member proportional electoral system; Overhang seats; Constituency seats; German electoral system; Electoral reform; German Bundestag (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K16 L38 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-025-01300-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:204:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-025-01300-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01300-6

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().