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Soft-power and pro-European bias in the UNESCO World Heritage List? A test based on ICOMOS experts’ evaluations of colonial sites

Martina Dattilo (), Fabio Padovano and Yvon Rocaboy
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Martina Dattilo: University of Turin
Fabio Padovano: University of Rennes
Yvon Rocaboy: University of Rennes

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 204, issue 3, No 7, 425-456

Abstract: Abstract European sites are said to be overrepresented on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Some scholars attribute this phenomenon to Western countries’ influence over international organizations, which results in the adoption of biased, pro-European aesthetic standards by UNESCO’s selection committee. We test this explanation by comparing the International Council on Monuments and Sites’ (ICOMOS) evaluations for sites of European (colonial) and native origins. We rely on two measures of site quality—Outstanding Universal Value and a textual analysis of ICOMOS’ reports. ICOMOS experts produce these evaluations based on UNESCO’s aesthetic standards before lobbying by member countries can take place. Hence, the evaluations reflect the stage of UNESCO’s decision-making process in which European 'soft power' is most likely to appear, if it in fact exists. After controlling for numerous potential confounders, our estimates show no statistical difference in ICOMOS’ evaluations of colonial vs. native sites, suggesting that ICOMOS experts appear impartial.

Keywords: UNESCO World Heritage List; International organizations; Cultural bias; Measurement of quality; Textual analysis; Cultural capital; Colonization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F53 H87 L15 O19 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01248-z

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