Do political elites capture crop insurance? Evidence from Indian agricultural households

Debdatta Pal ()
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Debdatta Pal: Indian Institute of Management Lucknow

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 205, issue 1, No 12, 283-301

Abstract: Abstract It is widely accepted that political elites rent-seek by redirecting public resources from targeted welfare programs to themselves. However, little is known about whether political elites also rent-seek in crop insurance programs. Using data from a nationwide household survey, this paper examines whether politically connected agricultural households are more likely to receive insurance payouts from a government-run crop insurance program compared to nonconnected households. I find an association between political elite capture and crop insurance payouts. The results of propensity score matching provide supporting evidence. I also find that capture is more likely when government banks implement crop insurance plans instead of private banks.

Keywords: Elite capture; Political connectedness; Crop insurance; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 Q14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01284-3

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