Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice

Zane Spindler

Public Choice, 1976, vol. 28, issue 1, 67-78

Abstract: Contrary to some criticism (Musgrave and Musgrave, and West) the small group collective choice model may yield a determinate, Pareto optimal solution even with all or none bargaining. Such bargaining as well as the solution are implied by the basic assumptions of the theoretical model. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1976

Date: 1976
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718458

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