What happens when majority rule breaks down?

Colin Bell

Public Choice, 1978, vol. 33, issue 2, 126 pages

Abstract: Computational results of Niemi and Weisberg are extended to investigate the number of alternatives in the top cycle set (possible winning alternatives in a sequence of pairwise votes) when there is no Condorcet winner. With n alternatives we assume a large number of voters each equally likely to select any of the n! preference orderings. If no Condorcet winner exists, the number of members of the top cycle set is always more likely to be n or n−1 than between 3 and n−2 inclusive. As n grows the probability that all alternatives are in the top cycle set approaches 1. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Social Sciences Division 1978

Date: 1978
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00118362

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