An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation amendment

Steve Mariotti

Public Choice, 1978, vol. 33, issue 3, 15-26

Abstract: This paper investigates electorate behavior on Proposal C, a proposed amendment to the Michigan constitution, whose passage would have limited taxes and expenditures in the State of Michigan. Voting behavior was analyzed within the framework of the basic hypotheses: that the electorate tended to vote on Proposal C in its economic interests, narrowly conceived. The results were contradictory, with some groups voting against their economic interests and others voting as the hypothesis would predict. Further, a relatively low percentage of the total voting variance was explained, indicating that perhaps other variables than economic ones influenced voting behavior. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers b.v 1978

Date: 1978
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00154681

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