Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections

Ryan Amacher and William Boyes

Public Choice, 1978, vol. 33, issue 3, 5-13

Abstract: The effect that the length of electoral periods has on the behavior of elected officials is examined. The hypothesis is that the longer the period between elections the less responsible or the more independent representatives will behave relative to the desires of their polity. The hypothesis is tested by examining the behavior of U.S. Senators. It is found that their independence follows a cyclical behavior which conforms to the electoral period. As a result it is by no means clear that decreasing the frequency of elections reduces the cost of elections. The effect of this independence cost on the optimal frequency of elections is discussed. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers b.v 1978

Date: 1978
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00154680

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