Revenue sharing and monopoly government

Richard McKenzie and Robert Staaf

Public Choice, 1978, vol. 33, issue 3, 93-97

Abstract: While revenue sharing is not likely to eliminate state and local taxation since the tax effort factor subsidizes increased governmental growth, it does tend to eliminate what Madison saw as a distinctive feature of the U.S. form of government, a compound republic. This essay has discussed why local and state officials have conceded the principles of a compound republic to a monopoly form of government. Federal, state and local officials find it to their advantages to collude and operate in a monopoly environment rather than in a competitive environment. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers b.v 1978

Date: 1978
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00154686

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