Pigouvian policies in closed behavioral systems

Peter Aranson, Terry Ferrar and Peter Sassone

Public Choice, 1978, vol. 33, issue 4, 5-26

Abstract: This essay-analyzes the Pigouvian tax-subsidy policy, reviews the traditional justification and several practical and theoretical criticisms of it, and offers three arguments about the Pigouvian policy and the implied structure of effluent charges (as well as subsidies). First, many proponents of a Pigouvian policy misinterpret its purpose. The tax is not designed to reduce pollution to an ‘acceptable’ level, but to maximize joint production value. Second, Pigouvian effluent charges may violate some constructions of the equal protection clause. Third, these charges may violate, also, some constructions of the due process clause, as well as the ethical criteria that the right of due process implies. Copyright Springer 1978

Date: 1978
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03187593

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