Rent-seeking competition in political parties

Robert McCormick and Robert Tollison

Public Choice, 1979, vol. 34, issue 1, 5-14

Abstract: Our results offer some preliminary support for an economic theory of competition within parties for positions of legislative leadership. This competition will dissipate the rents associated with the wage pay, perquisites, and outside earnings of these positions. We expect that where the wage pay and perquisites for majority leaders are low, more individuals who can efficiently combine outside earnings with these positions will compete for and capture them. This explains why lawyers are the dominant occupational group among legislators in general and among majority leaders in particular (McCormick and Tollison 1978). Yet there are no “free” outside rents in this case. The competition we observe with respect to the extra wage pay and perquisites that go with these positions will also dissipate the rents associated with their outside earning possibilities. As outside earning possibilities rise, entry will be attracted, and incumbent majority leaders will have to expend resources to resist potential competition for their jobs. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1979

Date: 1979
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00125748

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