Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A graphical exposition

Manfred Gärtner ()

Public Choice, 1979, vol. 34, issue 3, 365-380

Abstract: A public choice model of union wage bargaining behavior has led to the hypotheses that money wage growth rates crucially depend on government ideology and vary rhythmically with election dates. This provides another link between the economy and the polity in Western-type democracies which apparently has been neglected so far. The hypotheses were supported by a time series analysis of negotiated money wage growth rates in postwar West Germany. Finally, after a graphical presentation of the empirical results, the implications of this paper's findings for politicoeconomic modelling, wage theory, macroeconomic theory and policy, and industrial relations theory were briefly discussed. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers b.v. 1979

Date: 1979
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00225675

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