Economic competition and political competition: A comment

William Brown and Gary Santoni

Public Choice, 1980, vol. 35, issue 1, 27-36

Abstract: Unlike Stigler's original estimates, our re-estimation of his equations yields results which are consistent with economic theory. However, they raise questions regarding the extent to which the data provide a measure of support for the implications of his theory. Stigler's theoretical discussions of political coalitions does not specify the exact nature of the property rights of coalition members. His theory appears to be based on the ability of coalition members to exclude nonmembers. However, casual observation suggests such exclusionary rights are rare for the schooling coalitions upon which he bases his test. In the absence of such rights, observed coalition behavior will deviate predictably from that suggested by Stigler's theory. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1980

Date: 1980
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00154746

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