The Electoral College and voter participation rates: An exploratory note

Richard Cebula () and Dennis Murphy

Public Choice, 1980, vol. 35, issue 2, 185-190

Abstract: In section 2, it is argued that the Electoral College introduces into the Presidential election process certain disincentives to vote. These disincentives essentially take the form of reducing the perceived benefits of voting for a Presidential candidate by restricting the power of votes to state jurisdictions rather than allowing all votes equal value (power) in a national election determined strictly by a popular vote. The empirical results in section 3 strongly support this hypothesis. Actually, to the extent that voter behavior in Presidential elections molds voter behavior in other elections, the Electoral College may act to suppress voter participation in those elections as well. There may of course exist some question as to whether or not more voting is really desirable. If more voting takes place, but the results are the same as in the case with fewer votes being cast, then there are costs but few (if any) benefits to be derived from the additional voting. If, however, the preference system of the subset which does not vote is significantly different from that of the subset which does vote, the final election outcome can clearly be altered. In other words, there is no a priori reason to believe that the voting subset is an unbiased sample such that increased voter participation would not affect the election. In closing, one more observation seems appropriate, namely, that the non-voting subset may have preferences which are not represented by the choices offered in a particular election. For example, it has been argued that the Electoral College system tends to have a bipolarizing effect, discouraging third-party candidacy since they would have little chance to poll a majority of a state's votes. For this reason, it has been suggested that the electoral vote should either be allocated in proportion to the popular vote or simply replaced by it altogether. For a discussion of these and other points related to the Electoral College, see Bone (1965). To the extent that voters are discouraged from voting for any except major-party candidates, they may choose the only available third option, which is to refrain altogether from voting, since a vote for a third-party candidate that does run may be viewed as ‘wasted’, and, therefore, the costs of voting would (in the individual's appraisal) tend to outweigh the benefits. The results presented here are consistent with this notion. Abolition of the present Electoral College system may not only lead to more voting, but, in particular, to more voting for alternative parties, and hence to more voting for alternative national policies, than presently takes place. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1980

Date: 1980
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00140841

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