Voting as an act of contribution

Melvin Hinich

Public Choice, 1981, vol. 36, issue 1, 135-140

Abstract: This paper presents a theory which rationalizes voting in terms of the marginal utility a citizen derives from contributing a small amount of effort in the political process when the cost of voting is small. Citizens abstain when the marginal cost of voting exceeds the marginal perceived benefit. A simple choice rule for voting in a two candidate race is derived from the theory. This rule depends on the voter's subjective belief about the election outcome as well as his preferences for the candidates. The key assumption is that the voter's utility increases if he votes for a winner, or decreases if he votes for a loser. This assumption is no less plausible than the assumption that voters believe they can be pivotal. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1981

Date: 1981
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00163775

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